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India’s “Look East” policy was launched in the early 1990s as part of a concerted 
effort to elevate the strategic importance of Southeast Asia in the country’s foreign 
policy agenda. The policy has been described as going through various phases, with 
an accelerated pace and process of interaction in moving from one phase to the next, 
marked by a broadening and deepening of India’s interaction with the region. This 
has culminated in the most recent “phase” under the government of Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi, which has rebranded the policy as “Act East” to signify a more pro-
active and action-oriented approach towards the region. However, has there been any 
real and substantive change in India’s engagement with Southeast Asia in moving 
from one “phase” to the next? Does this narrative of phases in India’s post-Cold War 
engagement with Southeast Asia hold any substance? This article deconstructs the 
narrative of phases in India’s Look East and now Act East policy and argues that 
India’s eastward engagement has not been a process of simple linear progression. As 
such, while the concept of phases in India’s Look East policy serves as a useful 
narrative device, it does not capture the nuances of India’s post-Cold War re-
engagement with Southeast Asia, which has been far more complex than this 
narrative suggests.   
 
Keywords: Indian foreign policy, Look East, Act East, Southeast Asia, ASEAN.  
 
 
The year 2017 marks 25 years of dialogue partnership, 15 years of summit-level 
relations and five years of strategic partnership between India and ASEAN. The 
relationship between India and Southeast Asia has come a long way from the days of 
mutual mistrust rooted in concerns over India’s naval ambitions in the 1980s;1 New 
Delhi’s support for Vietnam following its invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) in 
1978 and recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in 1980;2 and Indian perceptions of 
ASEAN as “an instrument of neo-colonialism and a reincarnation of SEATO [South-
East Asia Treaty Organization]” following its creation in 1967. 3  Undoubtedly, 
India’s economic interactions, institutional linkages and security cooperation with 
Southeast Asian countries have grown in leaps and bounds in the post-Cold War 
period.  
The “Look East” policy, which was launched in the early 1990s to reengage 
with Southeast Asia, has been characterized by Indian scholars and policymakers as 
evolving through various “phases”, with an accelerated pace and process of 
interaction in moving from one phase to the next.4  This has been marked by a 
broadening and deepening of India’s engagement with the region: broadening as the 
policy has expanded beyond its initial geographic focus on Southeast Asia to 
encapsulate the broader East Asia and now Indo-Pacific region; and deepening to 
expand beyond its initial focus on economic integration towards greater political 
interaction and security cooperation. This has culminated in the most recent “phase” 
under Prime Minister Narendra Modi who assumed power in 2014 and rebranded the 
policy as “Act East” to signify a shift towards a more pro-active and action-oriented 
approach to the region.5  
However, is the recently rebranded Act East policy real? In other words, has 
there been any real and substantive change in India’s engagement with Southeast 
Asia under its most recent “phase”?  More broadly, does the narrative of phases in 
India’s post-Cold War engagement with Southeast Asia hold any credence? One 
could argue that the various phases of the Look East policy are rooted in domestic 
political rhetoric rather than foreign policy shifts as new governments have sought to 
differentiate their policymaking approach from previous administrations. Notably, 
the first phase corresponds with the Congress (Indian National Congress) 
government of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao that came to power in 1991, while the 
second phase was unveiled by the Atal Bihari Vajpayee-led BJP (Bharatiya Janata 
Party) government in the early 2000s after it assumed power in 1998-99 and 
continued under the Congress government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 
2004. Finally, the rebranded Act East policy emerged under the BJP government of 
Narendra Modi in 2014. Thus, each so-called phase of the Look East policy can be 
regarded as a mere rebranding exercise as new governments seek to rhetorically 
distinguish themselves from their predecessors.  
This article separates rhetoric from reality by seeking empirical evidence of 
the various phases of India’s Look East/Act East policy. In doing so, it seeks to 
validate the basis for the evolution of India’s post-Cold War engagement with 
Southeast Asia. In deconstructing the narrative of phases, the article argues that 
India’s relationship with Southeast Asia has not been a process of simple linear 
development. Rather, exogenous factors such as the 1997-99 Asian Financial Crisis 
(AFC) and India’s nuclear tests in 1998 have contributed to a non-linear progression 
in India’s eastward engagement. In this context, India’s Look East policy has been 
subject to peaks and troughs with some elements of the so-called later phases—such 
as the expanding geographic scope of the policy and focus on security cooperation—
evident from the very inception of the policy while other elements—such as the 
expanded Indo-Pacific orientation under the current Act East policy—remain a work 
in progress. This alludes to the fact that much of the rhetoric regarding the Look East 
policy is aspirational rather than reflecting the reality of India’s post-Cold War 
engagement with Southeast Asia.  
As such, while the concept of phases in India’s Look East policy serves as a 
useful narrative device, it does not capture the nuances of India’s post-Cold War re-
engagement with Southeast Asia, which has been far more complex than this 
narrative suggests. In other words, although there is some evidence to posit a 
qualitative change between the various so-called phases of the Look East policy, the 
narrative of distinct phases is not as definite and clear-cut as the literature represents 
it to be. After a brief overview on the origins of the Look East policy, this article first 
identifies and then challenges the basis for the various phases of the policy, 
culminating in the most recent Act East policy under the Modi administration.  
 
Launching Look East 
 
India launched its Look East policy in the early 1990s as part of a concerted effort to 
elevate the strategic importance of Southeast Asia in the country’s foreign policy 
agenda.6 What distinguished India’s post-Cold War re-engagement with Southeast 
Asia from previous periods of engagement was the fact that it was operating on 
multiple fronts by complementing the country’s longstanding historical, cultural and 
ideological links with the region with growing economic interdependence, political 
engagement and shared security interests. In this context, the Look East policy was 
seen as a “recalibration rather than a reincarnation” of India’s engagement with 
Southeast Asia, which placed greater emphasis on substantive engagement over 
rhetorical claims of “third world solidarity”.7 
Although there is some dispute over the exact origins of the policy, the 
establishment of India’s sectoral dialogue status with ASEAN in 1992 is most 
frequently cited as the start of the policy. The policy itself was enunciated during a 
speech by Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao during a visit to Singapore in 1994 
when he called for “forging a new relationship” with the region.8 In its annual report 
in 1992-93, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs noted that “India has decided to 
give a special policy thrust to its relations with the ASEAN”, although the term 
“Look East Policy” was first mentioned in the 1995-96 report.9 However, a precursor 
to the policy, known as the “Look East Destiny” was unveiled in the 1980s.10  
At a bureaucratic level, Southeast Asia’s increased importance in India’s 
foreign policy priorities was reflected in relations with ASEAN being elevated from 
the Secretary (East) to the Foreign Secretary-level in 1992 and the Economic Cell of 
the Ministry of External Affairs identifying ASEAN as one of its “thrust regions”.11 
This came amid a broader reorientation of India’s foreign policymaking process with 
greater emphasis on its economic dimension, which was facilitated by the creation of 
the Economic Division as a separate cell within the Ministry of External Affairs. In 
this context, despite being launched by Rao’s Congress government, the Look East 
policy maintained a non-partisan consensus as it became institutionalized in the 
country’s foreign policy architecture.12  
Externally, Singapore played a prominent role in facilitating New Delhi’s 
renewed engagement with Southeast Asia by serving as a key proponent of India’s 
sectoral partner and later dialogue partner status with ASEAN.13 The expansion of 
ASEAN in the 1990s through granting membership to the CLMV countries 
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) gave impetus to deepening India’s bond 
with ASEAN, given the geographic proximity of these countries to India. Notably, 
Vietnam’s entry into ASEAN in 1995 turned India’s longstanding relationship with 
that country from a source of mistrust in the India-ASEAN relationship into a source 
of strength. Myanmar also occupies a special place in the evolution of India’s Look 
East policy given the country’s geostrategic position at the crossroads of South and 
Southeast Asia.14 Indonesia and Malaysia are also important partners for India in the 
region: Indonesia as the region’s largest country that straddles the Indian Ocean and 
South China Sea; and Malaysia as the initial advocate for India’s dialogue 
partnership with ASEAN in the 1970s.15  
  
From Phase One to Phase Two 
 
Several policymakers and scholars have drawn the distinction between the first 
“phase” or decade of India’s Look East policy in the 1990s—which was characterized 
by growing trade and investment relations with Southeast Asia—and the second 
“phase” or decade that followed in the 2000s when India’s engagement with the 
region gained momentum amid more institutionalized linkages across a wider region 
and broader agenda.
 
The start of the ASEAN-India summit-level partnership in 2002 
is generally regarded as the beginnings of phase two, with the conclusion of three key 
agreements at the 2003 Bali Summit—a Framework Agreement on Comprehensive 
Economic Cooperation; a Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Combatting 
International Terrorism; and India’s accession to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation—signifying India’s deepening relationship with ASEAN at the 
economic, security and political levels, respectively.16  
Elaborating on the so-called second phase of the Look East policy, Yashwant 
Sinha, India’s former external affairs minister noted in 2003:   
 
India’s ‘Look East’ policy has now entered phase two. Phase one was focused 
primarily on ASEAN countries and on trade and investment linkages. Phase 
two is characterised by an expanded definition of ‘East’ extending from 
Australia to China and East Asia with ASEAN as its core. Phase two marks a 
shift from exclusively economic issues to economic and security issues.17 
 
Amar Nath Ram, former secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs with 
responsibility for relations with Southeast Asia, echoes this characterization of a so-
called first and second phase, noting that that there was “little overt strategic or 
holistic content in this relationship” during the first phase of the India-ASEAN 
relationship when the “thrust” of India’s Look East policy was “largely confined to 
trade and economic relations with Southeast Asia”.18 Meanwhile, the second phase 
was characterized by “a clear consolidation and expansion of our links with the region 
to now encompass, among others, political, strategic, defence, economic, science and 
technology and cultural areas of cooperation”.19 
Beyond official government discourse, India’s strategic thinkers have also 
embraced this narrative of a first and second phase in the Look East policy. For 
instance, Raja Mohan asserts that phase two of the policy placed an elevated 
importance on improving physical connectivity between India and Southeast Asia, 
with India’s northeast acquiring newfound importance as a land-bridge linking it to 
the markets of Southeast Asia.20 This in turn will allow India to “break the artificial 
political barriers between the subcontinent and Southeast Asia” through a rediscovery 
of its “extended neighbourhood”.21  
Thus, phase two of the Look East policy is characterized by a deepening and 
widening of India’s engagement with East Asia; deepening in the form of 
strengthening economic integration and moving beyond the economic dimensions of 
interaction towards strengthening political and security linkages, and widening by 
expanding the geographic scope of the policy beyond Southeast Asia to include the 
broader East Asian region, while maintaining ASEAN at the core of regional 
engagement. However, as the subsequent section demonstrates, this narrative paints 
an overly-simplistic and somewhat inaccurate picture of the evolution of the first two 
decades of the Look East policy. 
 
Deconstructing the Phase One/Two Divide 
 
The delineation between the first and second phases of the Look East policy is subject 
to several ambiguities and discrepancies. Notably, several aspects of the so-called 
second phase were already present from the early stages of the first phase. For one, 
claims that the strategic dimensions of the Look East policy only came to the fore 
during the second decade (or phase two) of the policy is belied by India’s institutional 
interactions during the first decade (or phase one). This includes India’s membership 
to several forums that maintained a distinct focus on security issues, including the 
ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996, associate and subsequent full membership 
of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) in 1994 and 
2000 respectively, the start of the ASEAN-India Senior Officials Meetings in 1998 
and observer status at the Western Pacific Naval Symposium the same year. Even the 
decision to add science and technology as an additional item in the sectoral dialogue 
agenda meeting in 1994 was premised on the desire to “add political significance to 
India’s association with ASEAN” as this area, according to India’s then Foreign 
Secretary J.N. Dixit, “impinged on defence and security issues”.22   
Moreover, there is also evidence that strategic compulsions preceded 
economic pressures in driving the launch of the Look East policy. Notably, the need 
to quell underlying mistrust in the India-ASEAN relationship rooted in India’s close 
relationship with Vietnam and the Soviet Union, and concerns over India’s naval 
modernization programme and hegemonic ambitions in South Asia predated India’s 
economic liberalization reforms that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
and foreign exchange crisis in 1991. As G.V.C. Naidu notes, “Although Rao has been 
credited with the ‘Look East’ policy, one can trace the roots of the policy to the 
initiatives the Indian Navy took in the late 1980s to re-establish links with its 
counterparts in Southeast Asia… Economic exigencies and political compulsions later 
were added incentives to look at Southeast Asia afresh.”23  
In this context, economic and strategic engagements between India and 
ASEAN cannot be regarded as mutually exclusive domains but rather mutually 
reinforcing and interdependent arenas with “trade and interdependence… regarded as 
the midwives of security”.24  This breaks down the narrative of a “deepening” of 
India’s interaction with ASEAN, marked by a shift from a purely economic and 
commercially-driven relationship during the first phase of the relationship to a more 
strategic (security and political)-driven relationship during the second phase. 
Furthermore, the “widening” narrative of the second phase of India’s Look 
East policy is also open to a degree of scrutiny given that India’s engagement with 
the broader East Asian region was at the heart of the policy from its very inception. 
Notably, the origins of the policy can be traced to India’s rapprochement with China, 
which began with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988, which one 
scholar has described as the “most important development with regard to India’s 
changing view of the East” and “key to India’s Look East policy”.25  Some even 
claim that Japan was the initial target of the Look East policy, but that when Tokyo 
did not reciprocate India’s overtures, the policy was reoriented towards Southeast 
Asia. 26  There are even reports that Prime Minister Narasimha Rao first made 
reference to the Look East slogan during a visit to South Korea in 1993.27  As former 
foreign secretary Kanwal Sibal noted in a 2003 speech, “India’s Look-East policy 
starts from North East Asia and not simply the ASEAN region.”28 The fact that 
Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s seminal Singapore lecture of 1994 was titled “India 
and the Asia-Pacific: A New Relationship” illustrates that the policy entailed 
engagement with the wider region from its very inception.29 
Additionally, the concept of a first and second phase in India’s relations with 
Southeast Asia overlooks the fact that the evolution of India’s engagement with the 
region was by no means a linear progression. Notably, during the late 1990s there 
was a distinct loss of momentum in India’s relationship with ASEAN as the AFC 
and backlash against India’s nuclear tests in May 1998 derailed some of the progress 
that had been achieved. With respect to India’s five nuclear tests during 11-13 May 
1998, the Fifth ARF meeting and ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting in Manila in 
July 1998 was the first forum where India faced the wrath of the international 
community. 30  India’s nuclear tests, as well as the subsequent deterioration in 
relations with Pakistan following the 1999 Kargil Crisis and mobilization of both 
countries’ militaries following a string of terrorist attacks during 2001-04, renewed 
ASEAN’s concerns about India-Pakistan tensions spilling over into the wider 
region.31    
Ultimately, the adverse impact of India’s nuclear tests on relations with 
ASEAN was relatively limited. As well as disagreements within ASEAN on how to 
respond to the tests, ASEAN’s muted response was also facilitated by India’s 
willingness to sign the protocol of the 1997 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear 
Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ), which helped generate goodwill for India among 
ASEAN member states.32  Moreover, ASEAN countries were more sympathetic to 
the geopolitical compulsions facing India (emanating from the nuclear capabilities of 
China and Pakistan) relative to the situation during the Cold War when India’s 
military modernization was seen in more ominous terms by some countries in 
Southeast Asia.33  
However, the AFC left a more lasting impact on India’s relations with 
ASEAN. The crisis slowed India’s burgeoning economic relations with the region, as 
the devalued currencies of several Southeast Asian countries undermined the 
competitiveness of Indian exports to the region.34  Furthermore, the fact that India had 
been largely shielded from the crisis—due to its restrictions on capital account 
convertibility—demonstrated that its economy still remained relatively detached from 
regional supply chains and transnational production networks.35 This contrasted with 
China’s financial support and role as buffer to the “contagion” effect of foreign 
capital outflows afflicting the region.36  
In the aftermath of the financial crisis there was a growing emphasis on 
strengthening economic linkages within the wider region.37 This led to the emergence 
of regional economic initiatives such as the ASEAN+3 and Chiang Mai Initiative 
currency swap agreement in 1999 from which India was excluded. This would leave a 
lasting legacy for India’s Look East policy as it came to be perceived as a peripheral 
or secondary player relative to other regional powers—notably China, Japan and 
South Korea—in its engagement with ASEAN.38  
As such, India’s engagement with the region underwent a cyclical process 
with peaks and troughs. This is overlooked in the narrative of phases that portrays 
India’s relations with Southeast Asia as a simple linear progression that moves from 
strength-to-strength. Thus, coupled with the fact that strategic considerations and a 
broader East Asian and Asia-Pacific orientation were at the heart of the Look East 
policy from its very inception, these developments challenge the narrative of a first 
and second phase in that policy.  
 
Justifying the Phase One/Two Divide 
 
Despite these deficiencies, it is apparent that the pace of India’s interaction with 
ASEAN has gained momentum over time. The clearest demonstration of this is the 
acceleration of India’s trade with ASEAN from the first to the second decade of the 
policy. From 1990 to 2000, India-ASEAN trade grew by almost 200 per cent—from 
approximately US$2.4 billion to US$7.1 billion—while growing by more than 500 
per cent from 2000 to 2010—to almost US$44 billion.39 Moreover, while there were 
sporadic developments in the political and security arenas, the first decade of the 
Look East policy was generally marked by interactions concentrated in the economic 
arena. Meanwhile, more diverse exchanges spanning the economic, political and 
security arenas marked the second decade or so-called second phase of the policy.  
This came as India’s engagement with ASEAN became more institutionalized, 
beginning with annual summit-level interactions in 2002, which was followed by 
India being admitted as a founding member of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005, 
ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) in 2010 and Expanded 
ASEAN Maritime Security Forum (EAMSF) in 2012. Deepening relations between 
India and Southeast Asia in the second decade/phase was also made evident by 
India’s accession to regional norms of interaction, including the Treaty of Amity and 
Cooperation in 2003, the signing of the “ASEAN-India Partnership of Peace, Progress 
and Shared Prosperity” in 2004, and the conclusion of a strategic partnership with 
ASEAN in 2012.40  In doing so, interaction with ASEAN had a “socializing effect” on 
India by reconstituting its interests, identity and foreign policy behaviour.41 
The second phase also witnessed a deepening of economic interactions fueled 
by the conclusion of a raft of free-trade agreements. At the bilateral level, this began 
with an early harvest scheme with Thailand in 2004, followed by a more substantive 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with Singapore in 2005 
and with Malaysia in 2011. At the multilateral level, a trade in goods agreement was 
concluded with ASEAN in 2009, made operational for the ASEAN-5 states in 2010 
and fully implemented for the remaining states in 2016, with a trade in services and 
cross-border investments agreement concluded in 2014. Negotiations for a broader 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), comprising the ASEAN+6 
countries also began in 2012.  
This was complemented by expanded security cooperation in the form of 
strategic partnerships, defence cooperation agreements, combined military exercises 
and coordinated patrols (though most these activities took place at the bilateral level). 
As such, it is apparent that both the substance and momentum of India’s engagement 
with Southeast Asia increased over the course of the second “phase” of the Look East 
policy.  
Moreover, the narrative of economic issues dominating the first phase of the 
Look East policy may have been used as a rhetorical device by the Indian government 
to focus engagement with ASEAN in less controversial areas during the earlier stages 
of the policy. This came as the government sought to downplay concerns that India 
would bring the baggage of its security issues in South Asia (most notably with 
Pakistan and China) into Southeast Asia.42 This was a prominent concern during the 
early stages of India’s Look East policy when there was an underlying “hesitancy on 
the part of Asia-Pacific regional nations and ASEAN countries to look at India on its 
own merits”.43  This desire to cultivate relations in the less controversial economic 
arena while adopting a “go-slow” approach on strategic issues accounted for India’s 
late admittance to forums focused on strategic issues, such as its exclusion from the 
inaugural meetings of the ARF in 1994 and Asia-Europe Summit (ASEM) in 1996.  
Thus, notwithstanding deficiencies —rooted in the false narrative that 
economic considerations preceded strategic considerations in the origins of the policy, 
Southeast Asia preceded Northeast Asia in India’s regional engagement and a 
proclivity to see India’s eastward engagement as a linear progression—the first and 
second phase in India’s Look East policy generally holds up as a narrative device to 
capture the evolution of the first two decades of India’s eastward engagement. The 
same cannot be said however, of the so-called third phase, referred to as the renamed 
Act East policy. 
 
Phase Three: Act East 
 
The election of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in May 2014 heralded the start of the 
so-called third “phase” of India’s Look East policy. This was formally announced in 
November 2014 when Modi unveiled the Act East policy at the 12th ASEAN-India 
Summit and EAS in Myanmar. 44  Modi indicated a renewal of India’s external 
engagement to parallel and complement a renewed domestic reform momentum: “A 
new era of economic development, industrialization and trade has begun in India. 
Externally, India’s ‘Look East Policy’ has become ‘Act East Policy’”.45 He added 
that this was “a reflection of the priority that we [India] give to this region”.46  
Undergirding these developments was a bolder foreign policy, which has 
been fuelled by the strong mandate of the Modi government, the government’s 
growth and development-focussed agenda and inherent hawkishness embedded in 
the ideology of the ruling Hindu-nationalist BJP.47 This has resulted in a “renewed 
energy, vigour, and planning in India’s engagement with the rest of the world” as it 
becomes a more “confident, articulate, rising power, willing to claim its place on the 
global high table and able to discharge its responsibilities”, as the Ministry of 
External Affairs noted in its 2015-16 annual report.48  
In the context of this bolder and more assertive foreign policy, India’s 
extended neighbourhood acquired special attention as the government articulated a 
“Neighbourhood First” policy, while the government pledged to take a more 
“integrated and holistic” approach to its regional engagement.49 Replacing “Look” 
with “Act” implied that India would be taking a more pro-active and action-oriented 
approach towards the region with a “priority on security, connectivity and regional 
integration”.50 In a speech in Singapore in November 2015, Modi noted the “purpose 
and vigour” with which his government had engaged Asia, adding that, “in the 
course of the last 18 months, my government has engaged more with this region than 
any other in the world”.51 This was also reflected in the establishment of a separate 
Indian Mission to ASEAN and the EAS in April 2015 with a dedicated ambassador 
to manage relations based at the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.52 
Underlying India’s renewed Act East/Look East policy are the “close 
linkages” between the country’s foreign policy and “domestic developmental 
aspirations”. 53  This development-driven agenda has placed special emphasis on 
strengthening connectivity, including infrastructure, people-to-people contacts and 
trade. This has been evidenced by the establishment of a Joint Task Force on 
Connectivity to expedite financing for physical and digital infrastructure projects 
between India and ASEAN.54 The focus on connectivity has also been reflected in 
attempts to facilitate connections between existing regional forums such as the Bay 
of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation 
(BIMSTEC) that has been promoted as a bridge between ASEAN and the South 
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) with the establishment of a 
Transport Connectivity Working Group in 2016.55 There has also been a proposal to 
institutionalize annual meetings between ASEAN and the Indian Ocean Rim 
Association (IORA), a regional forum that comprises states bordering the Indian 
Ocean Region.56  
Modi has also paid special attention to reaching out to overseas Indian 
communities.57 This is of particular importance to the Act East policy given “the role 
of the over 6-million strong Indian diaspora in the east in acting as a bridge and 
platform in developing close partnership with the countries of their adoption, and in 
the economic development of India”, according to M. Ganapathi, former Indian 
ambassador and Secretary (West) in the Ministry of External Affairs.58 Modi has 
also sought to strengthen India’s soft-power (cultural) influence in the region 
through the promotion of Yoga and revival of the ancient Nalanda University.59  
From a strategic perspective, as India’s trade and resource interests have 
grown, so has the significance of the maritime domain and the need for the Indian 
Navy to protect these interests.60  More than 90 per cent of India’s total external 
trade by volume and 77 per cent by value—accounting for over 40 per cent of the 
country’s GDP—now transits the maritime domain.61 This includes over 70 per cent 
of the country’s oil imports while more than 50 per cent of India’s trade passes 
through the Straits of Malacca. 62   As such, as one academic notes, while “in 
geographical terms India is located outside the South China Sea, in geopolitical and 
geoeconomic terms India now increasingly operates inside the South China Sea”.63 
Moreover, the South China Sea has also acquired added significance as a “maritime 
gateway” between the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific.64 In this context, India has 
developed a more emphatic position on maintaining freedom of navigation along 
these strategically vital waterways while calling for the peaceful resolution of 
maritime territorial and boundary disputes in the region.65  
The Act East policy has also witnessed a further broadening of its geographic 
scope amid a growing emphasis on the Indo-Pacific as a new strategic geography for 
the region. The term “Indo-Asia Pacific” or “Indo-Pacific” in its abbreviated form 
reflects the growing interconnectedness of South Asia/Indian Ocean and East Asia/ 
Western Pacific as a single strategic system with Southeast Asia/South China Sea at 
its core.66 This new strategic geography also reflects China’s and India’s growing 
maritime orientation and their ambitions to project power beyond their respective 
sub-regions. 67  In other words, the emergence of the Indo-Pacific as a new 
geopolitical space is in line with the widening of India’s perceived area of strategic 
influence and reveals the country’s emergence as a pan-Asian rather than merely 
South Asian power.  
The growing Pacific orientation of India’s Act East policy has been most 
evident in the country’s deepening relations with Japan and Australia. India’s 
relationship with Japan has moved from strength to strength with the conclusion of a 
“Special Strategic and Global Partnership” between the two sides in September 
2014, which notably refers to “Japan’s place at the heart of India’s Look East 
Policy”.68 With respect to Australia, Raja Mohan notes that “above all, Modi’s Act 
East policy has widened the canvas by putting Australia at the centre of India’s 
eastern strategy and the South Pacific back on India’s political radar”.69  India’s 
growing Pacific orientation has also been reflected in the establishment of the India-
Pacific Islands Cooperation Forum in November 2014.70 There are also indications 
that the geographic scope of the Act East policy has expanded to include countries in 
the Indian Ocean Region. For instance, during his visit to Bangladesh in December 
2014, Modi noted that “India’s Act East starts with Bangladesh”.71 This alludes to 
the government’s focus on improving physical connectivity between India and 
Southeast Asia and Bangladesh’s geographic position straddling India and Myanmar. 
India’s embrace of the Indo-Pacific as the new strategic geography of its Act 
East policy has also coincided with growing strategic cooperation between India and 
the United States.72 As Modi noted in a speech in January 2015, “When I look 
towards the East, I see the western shores of the United States. That tells us that we 
belong to the same vast region.”73  As a result, US-India strategic cooperation has 
increasingly developed an Indo-Pacific orientation as both countries began working 
together in addressing developments in Asia.74 For instance, the joint statement that 
was concluded between the two countries in 2015 notes a convergence of India’s Act 
East policy with the US “pivot” or rebalance towards Asia.75 In addition, the Joint 
Strategic Vision for the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean has also pledged to develop a 
roadmap for stepping up bilateral cooperation in several areas related to 
strengthening the regional architecture.76  
This strategic alignment has been most evident with respect to developments 
in the maritime domain. For instance, the joint statement issued following the visit of 
US President Barack Obama to India in January 2015 made specific reference to 
“safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom of navigation and over flight 
throughout the region, especially in the South China Sea”.77 This shared commitment 
to a rules-based order in the maritime domain has also been reflected in the conduct 
of combined naval exercises and patrols, often in coordination with other regional 
navies.  
 
Challenging Act East 
 
However, despite the hype of India’s Act East policy, claims of a further deepening 
and broadening of India’s external engagement under its so-called third phase does 
not hold up to empirical scrutiny. First, one could argue that the expanded 
geographic scope of the policy was already evident during earlier “phases” of the 
policy. For instance, despite claims that India-Japan relations have acquired growing 
significance under the Act East policy, India had already accelerated economic, 
political and strategic interactions with Japan during earlier phases of the Look East 
policy: both countries have been holding annual summit meetings since 2006; 
concluded a “strategic and global partnership” the same year, leading to the start of a 
strategic dialogue; and concluded an FTA in 2011, while Japan has long been a 
leading source of foreign direct investment and overseas development assistance for 
India.78   
Similarly, India held its first strategic dialogue with Australia in 2001 and 
concluded a memorandum of understanding on defence cooperation in 2006 
followed by a joint declaration on security cooperation in 2009. 79  India also 
concluded a dialogue partnership with the Pacific Islands Forum in 2003. All of 
these developments preceded the formal launch of the Act East policy, marking the 
third so-called phase of India’s post-Cold War engagement with Southeast Asia. 
Second, despite claims that India’s relations with the region has reached new 
heights under the Act East policy, the country retains the reputation of being the least 
consequential of the region’s major powers.80 On the economic front, despite claims 
of pursuing a more economically integrated relationship with the region, as of 2015 
India was still only ASEAN’s ninth-largest trading partner, with several much 
smaller economies having higher trade levels with ASEAN, including Taiwan and 
Hong Kong.81 Despite the conclusion of the India-ASEAN FTA, the country has yet 
to successfully integrate into the region’s manufacturing supply-chains, leading one 
scholar to proclaim that “in economic terms at least, India is yet to prove that it is a 
nation of consequence”.82 To be sure, there are still hopes that the trade in services 
agreement with ASEAN that came into force in 2015 will facilitate a strengthening 
of India’s economic relations with the region, particularly given that India maintains 
a comparative advantage in service-oriented industries.83  
Part of the problem is that India’s Act East policy is contingent on internal 
economic reforms, which will dictate the pace at which India further integrates with 
the economies of East Asia. Despite the Modi government projecting a more 
investor-friendly image, India’s historically protectionist and conservative economic 
policies remain well-entrenched. Chronic problems of bureaucratic inertia and inter-
ministerial coordination and complications associated with forging public-private 
partnerships and financing remain barriers to accelerating infrastructure connectivity. 
For instance, despite rhetoric of developing India’s northeast as “India’s Gateway to 
Asia in the 21st century”, there have been persistent delays in the completion of two 
key infrastructure projects: the India (Moreh)-Myanmar (Bagan)-Thailand (Mae Sot) 
Trilateral Highway (with the goal of eventually extending to Cambodia and 
Vietnam) and the Kaladan Multi-modal Transit project (connecting the ports of 
Kolkata and Sittwe).84  
A similar apprehension can be seen in India’s security diplomacy towards the 
region where there is a continued timidity in the Indian foreign policy establishment 
towards projecting power beyond its immediate neighbourhood.85 This is exacerbated 
by practical difficulties associated with the slow pace of India’s military 
modernization and the insufficient diplomatic resources deployed to East Asia, with 
less than 15 per cent of officers at the headquarters of the Ministry of External Affairs 
covering the region.86   
The Look East/Act East policy has also been “crowded out” to some extent 
by an increasingly bold and assertive foreign policy by other regional powers. This 
includes China’s “One Belt, One Road” initiative, the United States’ pivot towards 
Asia (although there are questions over whether this will be sustained under the 
administration of President Donald Trump) and renewed efforts by Japan to engage 
with the region through such initiatives as Shinzo Abe’s “Democratic Security 
Diamond” and a “China Plus One” strategy of diversifying foreign investment (most 
notably in Southeast Asia).87  
Adopting an increasingly expansive strategic geography stretching from the 
Indian Ocean Region to the Pacific also reveals a potential risk to the Act East policy 
as it becomes too broad and all-encompassing without a clear geographic or strategic 
focus. This could also serve to dilute the principle of “ASEAN centrality” that has 
traditionally formed the bedrock of the Look East policy.88  To be sure, official 
discourse continues to pay lip service to ASEAN centrality as a core principle of 
India’s Act East policy.89  However, India’s participation in a growing plethora of 
“mini-lateral” or trilateral groupings that exclude ASEAN alludes to the possibility 
that New Delhi’s policy of eastward engagement may gradually transcend ASEAN. 
These include a trilateral ministerial dialogue between India, Japan and the United 
States, which was upgraded to the level of foreign ministers in September 2015; an 
inaugural foreign secretary-level trilateral dialogue between Australia, India and 
Japan in June 2015; an India-Australia-Indonesia Trilateral Dialogue on the Indian 
Ocean; a track II-level dialogue between India, Japan and South Korea; track 1.5-
level dialogue between the United States, China and India; and the conclusion of a 
trilateral cooperation agreement among India, Japan and Vietnam in December 
2014.90 These initiatives reflect a broader inclination by regional powers to no longer 
anchor their security to ASEAN. 
As such, the jury is still out over whether there have been any real 
substantive changes to mark this new “phase” of India’s Look East policy, aside 
from it being rebranded as the Act East policy. Key elements of the Act East 
policy—including its broader strategic geography encompassing countries such as 
Japan and Australia and its development-driven and strategically-oriented 
approach—were already evident during earlier periods of India’s eastward 
engagement. Moreover, expanding the strategic geography of the policy to embrace 
the broader Indo-Pacific region has introduced challenges and ambiguities amid 
concerns that it will become too broad while diluting the policy’s traditional focus on 
ASEAN centrality. Several scholars have echoed these views, noting “scepticism 
about Delhi’s ability to convert words into deeds”, as well as questioning if Act East 
has been “largely rhetorical” and “a mere effort at rebranding”.91  In this context, the 




This article has sought to deconstruct the delineation of India’s Look East policy into 
various phases to establish whether the substance of India’s re-engagement with 
Southeast Asia in the post-Cold War period matches the rhetoric of the policy. What 
is revealed here is that although there is some evidence to posit a qualitative change 
between the various so-called phases of the Look East policy, the narrative of 
distinct phases is not as definite or clear-cut as the literature represents it to be. This 
speaks to the fact that much of the rhetoric regarding the Look East policy is 
aspirational rather than a reflection of the reality of India’s post-Cold War 
engagement with Southeast Asia. In this context, the launch of each phase often 
serves as a rebranding exercise as a new government seeks to differentiate its foreign 
policy approach from that of its predecessor.  
According to the official narrative, the geographic and functional scope of the 
Look East policy has expanded in moving from one phase to the next. India has 
made a concerted effort to expand beyond, while consolidating, engagement in the 
economic domain to more strategic-level interactions. It has also sought to expand 
beyond, and consolidate further, its interaction with Southeast Asia to strengthen 
engagement with the broader East Asian and then Indo-Pacific region. 
With respect to the expanding geographic scope, from the inception of the 
Look East policy in the early 1990s to the completion of phase one in the early 2000s, 
the key development was the expansion of ASEAN to include the CLMV states in the 
Mekong sub-region. This expanded the focus of India’s Look East policy from the 
original six members of ASEAN to the expanded 10-member organization, which 
now included one state that shares a land border with India (Myanmar) and another 
with which India has maintained long-standing and close relations (Vietnam), the 
same country that historically had also been a thorn in the India-ASEAN relationship. 
In shifting from phase one to phase two the geographic scope of the policy was 
further expanded to include the broader East Asia region. Finally, in shifting from 
phase two to a nascent phase three of a renamed Act East policy in 2014, the 
geographic scope of the policy is undergoing further revisions as the Indo-Pacific has 
increasingly replaced East Asia as the strategic geography of the policy. 
In reality, this shift has not been so clear-cut, as evidenced by the fact that a 
broader East Asia and Asia-Pacific orientation was evident from the very inception of 
the policy. However, India lacked the capability to project power in the initial stages 
of the policy, resulting in a primary focus on Southeast Asia. Moreover, while 
ASEAN centrality has remained a core principle of the policy, there are latent 
concerns over whether this will be sustained in the context of the expanding strategic 
geography of the region. Notably, in expanding the geographic scope of the policy to 
a broader Indo-Pacific orientation, there is a risk that the policy will become too broad 
and lose strategic focus as it accommodates a growing number of countries from the 
Indian Ocean to the Pacific. This shows that the “broadening” geographic scope of the 
Act East policy remains a work in progress. 
The expanding functional scope of the Look East/Act East policy is also open 
to scrutiny. Claims that the policy was largely driven by economic considerations 
during its inception with political and security considerations only gaining 
significance during the latter phases of the policy have been challenged by the fact 
that strategic factors were at the heart of the policy from its very inception. However, 
this narrative is to some extent vindicated by the fact that India sought to focus 
engagement with ASEAN in less controversial economic areas during the earlier 
stages of the policy in order to alleviate concerns that it would bring the baggage of 
its security concerns in South Asia into Southeast Asia.92  
Focussing on the most recent Act East policy that began under the government 
of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the jury is still out over whether the policy offers 
anything new, with evidence that its expanded geographic focus and its bolder and 
more assertive process of engagement was already evident during earlier phases of the 
policy. As such, despite rhetoric of moving from “looking” to “acting” east and 
efforts by the Modi government to strengthen regional connectivity and address 
regulatory and infrastructure bottlenecks to create a more investor-friendly 
environment, India still has a long way to go in escaping the reputation of being the 
least consequential major power for Southeast Asia.  
To be sure, these deficiencies do not diminish the relevance of the Look East 
policy. India’s interactions with Southeast Asia have grown leaps and bounds since 
the launch of the Look East policy in the early 1990s. Following a short-lived effort 
to build an Asian community of nations in the 1950s, benign neglect took over in the 
1960s and 1970s. The India-ASEAN relationship then underwent a rapid 
deterioration in the late 1970s and 1980s amid concerns over India’s support for 
Vietnam following its invasion of Kampuchea (Cambodia) in 1978. This was 
exacerbated by fears of an alleged India-Soviet-Vietnam axis and the implications of 
India’s naval modernization efforts.  
However, since the launch of the Look East policy in the 1990s, the 
perception of India as a threat to regional stability has not only dissipated but been 
replaced by a view of the country as a stabilizing force in the region. Moreover, from 
viewing India as a distant and disconnected power, it is now seen as an integral 
participant in the regional security architecture. As such, when benchmarked against 
other major powers in the region, India may still be regarded as a relatively 
peripheral player; but when judged on its own merits—both relative to its interaction 
with other regions in India’s extended neighbourhood and its historical interaction 
with Southeast Asia—India’s regional engagement has gained significant substance 
and momentum since the launch of the Look East policy.93 
To conclude, the concept of phases in India’s Look East policy is open to 
scrutiny given that India’s engagement with its eastern neighbours has not been a 
process of simple linear progression, instead going through a more cyclical process 
of peaks and troughs. Moreover, elements of the so-called later phases were already 
present during the earlier phases, as demonstrated by strategic considerations, 
security cooperation and a broader geographic scope being at the heart of the policy 
from its very inception. As such, while the concept of phases in India’s Look East 
policy serves as a useful narrative device for understanding the general progression 
of India’s eastward engagement since the early 1990s, it does not capture the 
nuances of India’s post-Cold War relationship with Southeast Asia, which has been 
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